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Introduction 
This paper will present an analysis of theN eighborhood Stabilization 
Program 1 (NSP1 ), one of three iterations of a federal housing program first adopted 
in 2008 to address the fallout of the 2007-2008 foreclosure crisis and its resulting 
impact on neighborhoods. Using the policy analysis framework described by Patton 
and Sawicki (1993), I will review the problem that this policy was designed to 
address and propose a framework for evaluating its response. My analysis is 
informed by real-world experience of having implemented NSP1 in Macon, GA, a city 
of roughly 93,000 people that has experienced decades of neighborhood decline and 
long suffered the impact of housing abandonment, vacancy, and foreclosures. One 
problematic aspect of federal housing policy in general is the need to respond to a 
diversity of housing markets and conditions nationwide, and I use examples from 
Macon and other communities to evaluate how adaptable the federal policy was to 
various local conditions, how well prepared communities were to respond to such a 
program, and whether and how NSP1 took local capacity into account. 
These and other questions lead to the examination of alternative policies-
particularly NSP2-a new iteration of NSP that attempted to correct for some of the 
problems experienced by NSP1. While the logic behind changes to the program can 
be read as an attempt to address program deficiencies and incorporate feedback 
from the implementation of NSP1, an examination of these changes reveals tradeoffs 
that were made involving equity, efficiency, political viability, and operability /local 
capacity. A brief analysis of NSP3-the latest iteration of the program-suggests 
some of these tradeoffs may not have been popular. I will conclude with a 
comparative evaluation of the three programs and make recommendations based on 
this analysis for potential future directions of the NSP. 
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Step 1: Defining the Problem 
One of the biggest challenges in developing policy at the federal level is 
defining the scope of the problem it seeks to address. In designing NSP1, there was 
a clear crisis that triggered this particular policy response-the 2007-2008 
foreclosure crisis. This crisis has been well documented as I will briefly describe 
below. What is less clear is how federal NSP policy makers interpreted the scope of 
the problem. This ambiguity is implicit in two key aspects of the program's design: 
1) the emergency nature of the federal assistance and timeframe by which it was to 
be implemented, and 2) the program activities eligible under the program and its 
means of delivery. The inherent contradiction, which may not be obvious on the 
surface, is that NSP1 was packaged as an economic stimulus intended to stabilize 
areas affected by the foreclosure crisis with a short timeframe for implementation, 
but its delivery and execution relied on traditional community development 
infrastructure and familiar community revitalization strategies, thus confining its 
approach while simultaneously undermining its premise. Furthermore, the 
targeting goals emphasized concentrating the use of funds in areas of "greatest 
need," which for some communities-like Macon in particular-were well beyond 
the point where "stabilization" alone could make a difference (Joice, 2011: 139). 
Before turning to a more in-depth analysis of these issues, I describe the conditions 
that led to the policy's enactment. 
The large-scale failure of sub-prime mortgages in 2006 triggered a national 
foreclosure crisis that not only caused a collapse in the housing market but also 
resulted in a far-reaching economic recession in the U.S. (and arguably beyond). 
The contagion effect that spread from the failure of sub-prime mortgages to the 
wider mortgage market in general led to nearly a tripling of U.S. foreclosure and 
delinquency rates and a deflation of home values by almost one-third between 2006 
and 2009. This crisis in the housing market not only impacted the economy writ 
large and individuals and families who lost their homes, but also neighborhoods that 
experienced these high rates of foreclosure and the concomitant impacts that these 
foreclosed properties had on their surrounding environs (Joice, 2011: 135). 
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In a policy brief prepared for the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Paul Joice cites several studies linking foreclosures to neighborhood-
level impacts, such as violent crime (Immergluck and Smith, 2006a) and deflation of 
property values (Immergluck and Smith, 2006b; Schuetz et al, 2008). The author 
also points to the fact that poor neighborhoods tended to have higher 
concentrations of subprime mortgages, thus magnifying the negative effects of 
foreclosures in poor and minority neighborhoods. In a separate analysis of the 
impacts of high-cost lending, Immergluck (2 011) confirms this problem. Citing a 
study of foreclosures in the Chicago region (Smith, 2 00 8), he points out that in 
census tracts that were over 80 percent minority experienced roughly five times the 
number of foreclosures per 1000 than those that were 10 percent or less minority 
(139). 
Immergluck also enumerates the multiple ways in which property vacancies 
and foreclosures add additional burdens and costs to local governments, including 
increased crime and fire department costs from vandalism and arson, demolition 
costs, legal expenses and record keeping, lost revenue from unpaid or foregone 
taxes, and lost economic development opportunities due to undesirable conditions 
for investment (Immergluck, 2011: 15 2). These conditions run counter to housing 
and community development expert Alan Mallach's description of a stable 
neighborhood, where, "simply stated, a stable neighborhood is a neighborhood 
where people feel that their investment is secure" (Mallach, 2010: 309). 
In Macon, GA, the above conditions describe many of the city's 
neighborhoods. A house-by-house vacant property survey conducted in 2008 by the 
city's Neighborhood Stabilization Division found over 2,000 vacant, abandoned, and 
dilapidated residential structures within the city-probably a low estimate of the 
total vacancies given the focus on properties that were only observably abandoned. 
Based on United States Postal Service data assembled by HUD, fully 60% of Macon's 
120 Census Block Groups had vacancy rates over 10%--half of those being between 
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15% and 36% (www.huduser.orgjportaljdatasets/NSP.html). For a comparison, 
the national average vacancy rate was 13% for rental and homeowner property 
during the same period (U.S. Census website, HVS). 
Around this same time, the city had over 400 properties that were 
condemned by the municipal court for demolition. This number has continued to 
outpace the City's efforts to clear these severely dilapidated properties, despite its 
push to increase demolitions from 30-40 per year to 75-100 per year. As noted 
above, the cost of these abandoned properties to the neighborhood and the city 
government is high. In Macon, the city's five residential property inspectors bring 
an average of 2000-3000 cases to court per year for housing code violations. Many 
of these cases include properties with absentee or unknown owners that are never 
brought into compliance, causing the city to expend funds on abatement actions or 
leaving the problem properties to fester in the community. From 2008 to 2012, the 
city budgeted over $1,000,000 in general funds for demolishing derelict 
properties-a number that would have to be increased by a magnitude of at least 
ten in order to catch up with the backlog of condemnations. While property 
demolition is a fairly popular strategy for both residents and politicians, the city has 
not demonstrated the will or the ability to adequately fund this program, nor has it 
well documented the aggregate effects the demolitions have had. Indeed, most of 
the positive impact of demolishing an abandoned property is highly localized in the 
immediate vicinity, and only felt for a short period of time, that is, until the cleared 
lot becomes an eyesore and an overgrown haven for vermin. After a property is 
demolished, a lien is placed against it for the cost of the demolition, which invariably 
exceeds the market value of the now-vacant lot. Generally, a cleared lot remains in 
the name of the absentee owner until the city takes steps to foreclose on the lien, an 
expensive and time-consuming process that the city will only initiate if a new use 
has been identified for the property and funds are available to cover the costs. 
While this may paint a rather grim picture of local neighborhood conditions, 
it is by no means an exaggeration. However, it only reflects one out of a multitude of 
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cities that all fall along a continuum of neighborhood conditions. The reason a 
discussion of an extreme example is useful here in evaluating the NSP program is 
because it helps to delineate the boundaries of the problem and identify the scope of 
the policy and the change it seeks to achieve. Mallach, among other community 
development specialists, argues that different types of neighborhoods enjoying 
varying levels of stability or distress require different types of policy interventions 
(Mallach, 2010: 236-244). While he states that delineating specific typologies may 
be arbitrary, he notes that many larger cities such as Minneapolis, Baltimore, and 
Philadelphia have adopted policies that segregate neighborhood revitalization 
strategies by neighborhood classifications describing their general conditions. In 
Baltimore these policies include preservation, stabilization, reinvestment, and 
redevelopment. In Minneapolis they include protection, revitalization, and 
redirection (Mallach, 2010: 237). 
This common approach to community revitalization begs the question once 
again: how do we define the scope of the foreclosure problem in order to develop a 
coherent policy at the federal level that can be implemented locally? Returning to 
the specifics of the foreclosure crisis, we now see that the problem is quite 
complicated because neighborhoods, communities, cities, and regions were all at 
different stages of development when the crisis hit, and were presumably impacted 
in different ways, calling for different approaches. To define the problem simply as 
a foreclosure crisis resulting in a glut of foreclosed properties that need to be re-
occupied misses the larger picture-that some locales had already fully realized the 
negative impact of property foreclosure and abandonment due to local, rather than 
national, economic conditions, while others were only experiencing these conditions 
for the first time. In the following section, I will establish an evaluative criteria to 
provide a framework for analyzing NSP1 and comparing its subsequent iterations. 
This method attempts to take into account the trade-offs between highly targeted 
and general approaches to foreclosures and property abandonment in the wake of 
the national foreclosure crisis. I will then discuss the specifics of N SP1, 2, and 3, and 
evaluate these alternative policies based on the defined criteria, using examples 
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from Macon to illustrate and highlight various strengths and shortcomings of the 
programs. 
Step 2: Policy Evaluation Criteria 
So far I have laid out a picture of a problem, or rather, set of problems, which 
result from foreclosure and abandonment and have impacted communities in 
different ways and to different degrees. In the context of the most recent 
foreclosure crisis, these costs have been felt at the level of the individual, the 
neighborhood, the local (and state) government, and the national economy. Any 
policy solution must take into account the specific problem it seeks to address and 
the scale at which it will be addressed. The policy considered here-NSP1-counts 
as its main objective neighborhood stability. Thus, an evaluation of NSP1 should 
measure how well neighborhood stability was or could be achieved (and based on 
what definition), and what are the benefits of the policy relative to its costs. Below I 
propose five dimensions for evaluating the policy that I believe are the most 
important for determining its viability j desirability and for selecting among 
alternatives or recommending changes to current policy. 
Benefits to the Community 
More than anything, a policy aimed at stabilizing communities affected by 
foreclosed and abandoned properties should produce benefits that directly relate to 
this goal, and the benefits should be proportional to the costs so that they endure 
beyond the immediate short term. For example, demolishing one abandoned 
structure or building one house in a neighborhood may make a difference in the 
short-term and immediate vicinity, but unless the removal of blight or introduction 
of the new homeowner is supported and sustained over time and through additional 
efforts, the benefits may be short-lived and limited to an individual rather than the 
neighborhood, and prove to be a lost investment over time. Benefits should also 
accrue exponentially, so that more benefits can be realized with fewer resources as 
resources are increased. 
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Political Viability 
Political viability is critical to any policy to be considered. Even if a policy is 
proven to provide certain benefits, there should be enough consensus over how 
these benefits are realized, and to whom, to enable the policy to be effectively 
implemented without risk of being undermined by those who oppose it. In order to 
be politically viable, a policy generally has to appeal to key constituencies and 
interested parties who may not share the same goals and values. For instance, a 
bank may want to sell its foreclosed properties but may not believe it should sell 
them at a discount or have to make significant repairs prior to sale. Alternatively, a 
community may want the city to demolish or repair an abandoned home in their 
neighborhood but they may not want a "project" home in their neighborhood. This 
latter example may appear to be a caricature but it actually occurred in one of 
Macon's proposed focus areas, where a homeowners association actually held a vote 
to oppose the use of N SP1 funds in their subdivision. Thus, political viability is 
important at both national and local scales. 
Administrative Operability 
I consider administrative operability as the most important criteria in the 
evaluation of a policy. Whether or not there is capacity to administer a policy, either 
at the national, state, or local agency level, is central to its success. The lack of 
administrative operability can create hostility within agencies and the public and 
frustrate future attempts to address a particular problem through government 
intervention. At the very least, a policy that cannot be efficiently or effectively 
administered will not achieve its goal. For example, the federal government's 
attempt to induce mortgage servicers and banks to modify mortgages and provide 
relief from foreclosure to homeowners proved incapable of being efficiently 
administered, and produced far fewer benefits than was hoped. A policy formed at 
the federal level to be implemented locally must also consider the administrative 
capacity of the local agencies designated to carry it out. 
Equity 
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Housing policy should produce benefits that are equitable and that recognize 
and respond to the needs and vulnerabilities of specific groups of people. It should 
address vertical equity to ensure that those most in need are served, and horizontal 
equity in order to avoid arbitrary distribution of benefits. While policy goals may 
conflict somewhat with providing only for the neediest first, a policy should 
nevertheless take a balanced approach between achieving overarching goals while 
addressing issues of equity. 
Sustainability. Affordability. and Risk 
Sustainability, affordability, and risk are important aspects of a policy's long-
term success. Sustainability refers to the ability of a policy's outcomes to remain 
stable over time without continuous subsidy. This may manifest itself in a policy 
that actually produces income to sustain or reproduce itself, or one that changes the 
economic or social environment is such a way that outcomes are sustained through 
the creation value in the form of private and social capital. 
Affordability is similar to the idea of community benefits above, but 
specifically relates to a policy's ability to achieve its stated goal within the level of 
subsidy or resources allocated to the program. Thus, a policy cannot be considered 
affordable only because a certain amount of resources that were allocated to it were 
deemed "affordable" to the funding agency. Rather, those resources must be 
sufficient to achieve the stated purpose or goal of the policy. In the City of Macon, 
for example, the program for demolishing condemned residential properties may 
not be considered affordable, because the city is unable to reach the goal of 
demolishing all condemned properties at the level of resources currently allocated. 
Risk refers to the level of uncertainty of a policy's outcomes, i.e., the potential 
of a policy to produce unwanted or negative externalities, and the stability of the 
policy itself. In addition, this criterion should take into account the risk to the 
administrator of the policy, whether it is a federal or local government, nonprofit or 
for-profit agency, and consider whether regulations are unambiguous enough and 
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stable enough to allow the administrator to steer clear of regulatory violations or 
fines. 
These criteria are not comprehensive, but I believe they are essential to 
consider in evaluating a stabilization policy's potential for success. Because the 
problem of foreclosed and abandoned homes in the context of the national 
foreclosure crisis is complex and suggests intervention at multiple levels and scales, 
careful policy development is especially critical. In the following section, I will 
describe the alternative policies to be considered before evaluating and selecting 
among them or suggesting changes. 
Step 3: Policy Alternatives 
Alternative 1: NSP1 
In mid-2008 as it became clearer and clearer that robust government 
intervention was needed to stem the rising tide of home foreclosures and the 
concomitant nationwide economic collapse, President Bush signed into law the 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, otherwise known as HERA. The Act 
directed hundreds of billions of dollars through several new programs targeting 
foreclosure prevention, yet only a small portion of the funding was designated to 
address the direct impact of newly foreclosed, vacant and abandoned properties on 
neighborhoods. The Neighborhood Stabilization Program (referred to as NSP1), 
authorized $3.9 billion for the acquisition, rehabilitation, resale, and land banking of 
foreclosed and abandoned residential properties, among several other uses. 
Congress gave the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 60 days 
to design the details of the program, including a formula to calculate the distribution 
of funds to states and units of local government, and mandated that these agencies 
obligate their funds to specific projects within 18 months of their receipt (Blum, 
2011 ). The program was designed to last 4 years, after which time the Treasury 
would recapture any unspent funds. 
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At the outset, there was debate between Democratic lawmakers and the Bush 
administration about the need for this program and its size. The Bush 
administration resisted including the it in HERA at first. Eventually they ceded to a 
$4 billion authorization in exchange for support for a much larger macroeconomic 
package of funds for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Federal Reserve actions to keep 
interest rates in check, and a new home buyer tax credit (Joice, 2011). On the other 
side of the debate, Democratic representative Barney Frank pushed for a $15 billion 
NSP1-an amount that would have made a marked difference in the scope and 
reach of the program-but failed to achieve this goal in the end (Phillips and White, 
2008). 
The policy justification for NSP1, according to Joice, was that while HERA 
included large-scale funding for foreclosure prevention and housing market 
stabilization on a macroeconomic level, there was need for a more targeted program 
to "soak up the emerging glut of foreclosed units and help neighborhoods where 
foreclosures and vacancies were causing particularly severe problems" (Joice, 2011: 
136). While critics of this approach argued that the foreclosure process signifies a 
chance for the market to correct itself after its excesses and reset prices to more 
realistic levels, Joice explains, policymakers and housing advocates recognized the 
risks this posed to communities and neighborhoods. As I detailed earlier, these 
"negative externalities" include the vulnerability of vacant properties to crime and 
vandalism, deterioration of the property due to a lack of investment, and depressed 
neighborhood housing values due to discounted sales of distressed properties 
(Joice, 2011: 137). 
The details of the policy suggest how lawmakers, and subsequent federal 
policymakers, imagined these problems could be addressed. First, the funding was 
to be implemented at the state and local level by HUD entitlement recipients, with a 
minim urn grant size of $2 million per local entitlement, and a bout $19 million 
minimum per state. Any entitlement whose funding determination fell below $2 
million had their share rolled up into the state's grant and was left to petition the 
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state for funding (although many states, including Georgia, developed their own 
direct allocation method). This effectively reduced the number of direct grantees 
that HUD would be responsible for to just over 300, which HUD believed was key in 
making the program manageable. The funding formula for states was derived 
through an algorithm that took into account a number of foreclosure-related factors, 
including: 
• Foreclosure starts in • Number of Loans 60 to 
last 6 quarters 89 days delinquent 
• Foreclosure rate • 60- to 89-day 
• Number of subprime delinquent rate 
loans • Vacancy rate in Census 
• Subprime rate Tracts with more than 
• Number of loans in 40% of the loans High-
default cost 
• Default rate 
Local funding was calculated by each locality's proportion of estimated foreclosure 
starts in the last 6 quarters and the local vacancy rate in Census Tracts with more 
than 40% of the loans high-cost compared to the state (HUD User website). 
NSP regulations were developed specifically to address the foreclosure crisis, 
but their basic structure was built on the chassis of the Community Development 
Block Grant (CDBG) Program. This program, initiated in 1974, is funded through 
HUD and allocates funds to states and localities under three broad national 
objectives: 1) to benefit low- and moderate-income people; 2) to prevent or 
eliminate slum and blight; and 3) to provide assistance to deal with urgent needs 
such as national disasters or major health and safety risks to communities. States 
and entitlements develop their own local plan, called a Consolidated Plan, which 
identifies priorities for spending the funds over a certain period of time (HUD.gov 
website, Office of Community Planning and Development). 
Under NSP, only the first national objective was considered eligible, although a 
major change was made which heretofore had not been authorized under CDBG: the 
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income limits for beneficiaries was increased from low and moderate, or 50% and 
80% of area median income (AMI), to middle income individuals at 120% AMI. 
However, in order to ensure the provision of housing for very low-income 
individuals, 2 5% of each grant was set aside for housing for those making less than 
50% AMI. Like the federal HOME program, a minimum period of affordability was 
established using HOME program requirements as a safe harbor, but allowing 
grantees to impose stricter requirements (Federal Register, 2008: 58330). Another 
change that was made was the removal of the 1-for-1 replacement rule for 
demolishing housing with federal funds. In addition, five broad categories of eligible 
activities were identified for states and communities to design their programs, 
including to: 
(A) "establish financing mechanisms for purchase and redevelopment of 
foreclosed upon homes and residential properties, including such 
mechanisms as soft-seconds, loan loss reserves, and shared-equity loans for 
low- and moderate-income homebuyers; 
(B) purchase and rehabilitate homes and residential properties that have been 
abandoned or foreclosed upon, in order to sell, rent, or redevelop such 
homes and properties; 
(C) establish land banks for homes that have been foreclosed upon; 
(D) demolish blighted structures; and 
(E) redevelop demolished or vacant properties" (Public Law 110-289, sec. 
2301(c)(3)). 
States and localities were then given a limited amount of time to develop their 
own plans, and were mandated to use the funds in so-called "areas of greatest need." 
HUD developed a formula to calculate "foreclosure risk scores" by Census Tract 
(again based on local foreclosure and high-risk loan data), and required grantees to 
use these indices in identifying and allocating funding to local areas of greatest need. 
While this area had to meet a minimum risk score threshold, the grantee was free to 
identify a large area or group of areas, or a single Census Tract. 
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In addition to these basic rules, several aspects of the policy were changed early 
in the planning and implementation stage. This included a requirement that 
foreclosed real-estate owned (REO) properties be purchased at a discount, the size 
ofwhich was revised from 15% to 1% in a subsequent Federal Bridge Notice 
updating the policy in 2009. This was done out of overwhelming concern that these 
forced discounted sales would either depress housing values further by creating low 
com parables, or prevent grantees from having the flexibility needed to purchase 
REO properties from reluctant owners or when there was competition from other 
property investors. Also, HUD had initially planned for all reinvestment of program 
funds to halt abruptly after 5 years and for all program income to be returned to the 
Treasury. While this was a statutory requirement of HERA, the subsequent 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) that created NSP2 repealed the 
provision and the Federal Bridge Notice updated the requirement allowing program 
income to be reinvested back into NSP-eligible activities indefinitely (Federal 
Register, 2009: 29224) 
While I have not provided a fully detailed account of NSP1 due to space, I have 
included what I believe to be the key aspects of this policy. In summary: 
• NSP1 was a federal policy response to the glut of foreclosed and abandoned 
housing created by the 2007-2008 foreclosure crisis and its impact on 
neighborhoods; 
• The federal government provided $4 billion to HUD to create a program that 
would allow for the purchase, rehabilitation, redevelopment, demolition, or 
land banking of foreclosed, vacant, and abandoned properties; 
• Funding was distributed to state and local entitlement communities using a 
block grant formula based on data collected by HUD to estimate the severity 
of the foreclosure crises in each locale; 
• Housing funded through this program was to be rented or sold to persons 
making 120% AMI or below, and 25% of the funding was targeted to people 
at 50% or less; 
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• Grantees had 18 months to obligate their funds, and 4 years to completely 
expend them; and 
• Grantees devised their own implementation plans by identifying their local 
areas of greatest need and describing the distribution and use of funding 
across the different types of eligible activities. 
Alternative 2: NSP2 
In 2009 at the start of the Obama administration it was clear that economic 
recovery was going to be much more elusive than previously thought. The 
administration argued for and was able to pass a second "stimulus" package, called 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) in order to address 
the ongoing financial crisis. Among several programs designed specifically to create 
jobs and stimulate the economy in the short term, ARRA also designated programs 
to help those impacted by the crisis, including a second round of Neighborhood 
Stabilization funds called NSP2. 
Key differences in this second round of funding were that it was converted to 
a competitive grant for which states, local jurisdictions, non profits, and consortia of 
non profits (with for profit agencies included) could compete. Also, $2 billion, 
rather than the $4 billion of the first round was authorized, and $50 million was 
reserved to provide capacity building and technical assistance to both NSP1 and 
NSP2 grantees (NeighborWorks America Stable Communities website). The method 
for determining areas of greatest need for use in targeting the funds was also 
changed. A foreclosure need index on a scale of 1-2 0 was created (rather than 
NSP1's foreclosure risk score from 1-10), and grantees were allowed to aggregate 
an average need score across non-contiguous Census Tracts, as long as the average 
was 18 or higher (or no less than the state's designated minim urn score). This 
geographic targeting was made easier through a HUD-provided on-line mapping 
tool. 
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The NSP2 grants were limited to $5 million minimum awards, with a 
requirement that the funds "touch" at least 100 separate housing units. Through the 
competitive process, grantees had to prove they had the capacity to administer the 
grant by documenting that they had developed a minimum of 75 units of housing in 
the previous 24 months. Unlike NSP1, NSP2 funds designated redevelopment only 
for housing uses. Therefore, converting vacant land to parks or green space was no 
longer an acceptable use (this was allowed under NSP1). Also, demolition was 
limited to only 10% of the total grant allocation, with a process for requesting a 
waiver up to 2 Oo/o, and land banks were given the ability to acquire residential 
property other than foreclosures. As in NSP1, administrative costs were capped at 
10%. Finally, a key change was made in April of 2010 that became retroactive to 
NSP1 as well, expanding the definition of "foreclosed" and "abandoned" to allow for 
additional types of property purchases such as short sales (Greenburg, 2009). 
While the five main eligible uses identified in NSP1 remained the same, the 
nature of this second iteration of N SP marked a substantial departure from the first 
approach. The changes outlined above indicate a move away from a purely "need 
based" approach. In a presentation on NSP2 at a national conference in 2009, Sarah 
Greenberg summarized these differences, which she characterized as "attempts to 
address the challenges inherent in [NSP1 ], by focusing on: 
• Regional approaches 
• Geographic targeting (concentration of resources) 
• Capacity to carry out activities 
• Comprehensive planning 
• Leveraging resources 
• Public/private partnerships 
• Rational use of land 
• Interventions likely to succeed 
• Requiring energy efficiency" (Greenberg, 2009) 
One of the main impacts of this new policy was the drastic reduction in number 
of direct grantees, along with variation in types of grantees, including national and 
regional non profits and nonprofit consortia, as well as state and local jurisdictions. 
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The number of direct awards from HUD dropped from 309 to 56, although there 
were 482 applicants for NSP2, including Macon, GA, which was not awarded an 
NSP2 grant (N eighborWorks America Stable Communities website). In fact, Georgia 
was among several states that received no NSP2 funding at all, causing many 
questions about the equitable distribution of funds. 
Alternative 3: NSP3 
Finally, NSP3 was adopted in July 2010 as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This latest round of NSP funding was reduced 
to $1 billion, and the method of allocation was shifted back to the NSP1 block grant 
formula. States were guaranteed a minimum grant ofO.So/o of the total funding (as 
in NSP1 ), 2% was set aside for technical assistance, and the cutoff point for direct 
allocations to local jurisdictions was reduced from $2 million to $1 million (for this 
round, the City of Macon received a $1.5 million award). One additional key change 
in this policy was that it expanded the eligibility of properties allowed to count 
toward the 25% low-income targeting goal to include vacant properties, meaning 
that properties did not have to meet the definition of "foreclosed" in order to meet 
this requirement (stablecommunities.com website). This change made a significant 
difference in Macon, for example, enabling the redevelopment ofland assembled by 
the Land Bank Authority in a strategic location that otherwise would not have been 
eligible to count toward the low-income set-aside. It reflects a considerable effort 
by national advocacy groups such as the National Foreclosure Prevention and 
Neighborhood Stabilization Taskforce (NFPNSTF) to influence the ongoing federal 
policy response from community and housing advocates' perspectives (NFPNSTF, 
2009 letter to Senator Chris Dodd). 
Another provision that was unique to NSP3 was the requirement that 
grantees prioritize low-income rental housing and provide a plan for hiring workers 
for NSP-funded projects from the local vicinity. Other minor changes were made as 
well, such as a geo-targeting tool, which allowed grantees to draw boundaries 
around project areas and receive data specific to that area indicating eligibility 
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(using the 20-point foreclosure need scale from NSP2), detailed neighborhood 
conditions, and the minimum number of properties needed to "stabilize" the area. 
Below I present a table adapted from N eighb orworks America's Stable 
Communities website that lists the key aspects that differentiate these three policies 
before evaluating them individually based on the criteria discussed earlier. 
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Table 1: Comparison of NSP1, NSP2, and NSP3 attributes 
NSP1 NSP2 NSP3 
Act passed in 2008 (Division 
Announced and applications due in 2009 
B, Title Ill of the Housing 
(Title XII of Division A of the American Passed July 2010 (Dodd-Frank 
Year 
and Economic Recovery Act 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Wall Street Reform and 
[HERA] of 2008) 
[the Recovery Act]. Awards announced Consumer Protection Act). 
2010. 
Amount $3.92 billion 
$2 billion ($50 million set aside for technical $1 billion (up to 2% set aside for 
assistance) technical assistance) 
Competitive application process open to 
local governments and non profits; 
HUD provided grants to all collaborations were encouraged and could 
Methodology states and selected local include private sector partners. Grantees Distributes funds by the formu Ia 
of Awards governments on a formula were selected on the basis of foreclosure allocation used for NSPl. 
basis. needs in their selected target areas, recent 
past experience, program design and 
compliance with NSP2 rules. 
NSP funds may be used for 
activities which include, but Key Changes: Key Changes: 
are not limited to: 
Establish financing 
Minimum purchase discount changed 
mechanisms for purchase 
from 5%to 1%for individual properties, and Funds available until 
and redevelopment of 
from 15% to 5% average for the overall expended. 
foreclosed homes and 
residential properties. 
portfolio. 
In April, 2010, HU D changed the 
definitions of "foreclosed" and "abandoned" 
Grantees have 2 years from 
for the purposes of identifying eligible 
Purchase and rehabilitate 
properties for NSP1 and NSP2 to include 
the date HUD signs their grant 
homes and residential 
properties where the mortgage is 60 days 
agreements to expend 50% of 
Eligible Uses 
properties abandoned or 
delinquent or tax payments are at least 90 
the funds and 3 years to expend 
foreclosed. 100%. 
Establish land banks for 
days delinquent. This allows for a property 
Establishes a minimum grant 
foreclosed homes. 
to be acquired through a short sale, and was 
size of $1 million for cities and 
intended to streamline the process of 
counties. 
acquisition. Changes are retroactive to NSPl. 
Permits redevelopment or 
rehab of "vacant" properties to 
Demolish blighted qualify for the 25% low-income 
structures. set aside (previously only 
"abandoned or foreclosed" 
homes counted). 
Redevelop demolished or 
vacant properties 
Number of 
N/A 482 N/A 
Applicants 
Number of 
309 56 270 
Awards 
Funds are to be obligated Recipients must expend 50% of allocated 
Grantees have 2 years from the 
within 18 months of funds within 2 years of the date funds are 
date H UD signs their grant 
Deadlines 
availability to recipient; and available to the recipient, and 100% of funds 
agreements to expend 50% of 
expended within 4 years. must be expended within 3 years. 
the funds and 3 years to expend 
100%. 
Source: http : //www.sta blecommunities.org/nsp -strategies 
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Step 4: Evaluation of Policy Alternatives 
Below I present an evaluation of NSP1, 2, and 3 based on the dimensions 
described above. I rank each policy on a score of 1-10 (10 being the highest rank), 
and have also weighted the criteria slightly to reflect their relative importance in the 
scheme I propose. I do not attempt an exhaustive evaluation here, but rather, one 
that is practical and informative based on the scope of this paper, and informed 
mainly by examples from Macon rather than a comprehensive study of NSP 
recipients. The weighing scheme is as follows: 
• Benefits to the Community=15% 
• Political Viability=2 5% 
• Administrative Operability=30% 
• Equity=15% 
• Sustainability, Mfordability, and Risk=15% 
Benefits to the Community: NSP1 (score of 6 out of 10) 
To the extent that NSP1 regulations enabled the design and implementation 
of activities directly related to addressing foreclosed and abandoned properties, I 
consider this policy to be moderately effective. However, the level of effectiveness 
was highly dependent on each jurisdiction's capacity to respond. Unlike foreclosure 
prevention measures contained in HERA, which were largely homogenous 
nationwide, the foreclosure response of NSP1 depended on the civic infrastructure 
oflocal jurisdictions to deliver the program and produce the desired benefits (Joice, 
2011). In a study of regional responses to the foreclosure crisis focusing on both 
prevention and recovery efforts, Swanstrom et al. (2009) propose a useful concept 
in evaluating policy design: regional resilience. In this report on six paired 
metropolitan regions heavily impacted by the crisis, the authors find that even 
controlling for differences in housing market conditions (i.e., weak vs. strong 
markets), the ability of regions to respond was varied based on their level of 
resilience. Resilience, as they define the concept, is "the ability of a system (region, 
government, company, nonprofit, or individual) to bounce back from an external 
stressor or challenge and recover healthy functioning" (3). They find that "Evidence 
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of resilience is the ability of regions and the organizations within them to respond to 
the challenge by: 
1) redeploying assets or expanding organizational repertoires; 
2) collaborating across public, private, and nonprofit sectors; and 
3) mobilizing or capturing resources from external sources" (Swanstrom et 
al., 2009: 4) 
These observations resonate with the City of Macon's response to the 
announcement of NSP1 awards. While Macon did not receive a direct grant from 
HUD (it was just below the $2 million cut off), it mobilized local partnerships with 
the Land Bank Authority, the Housing Authority, Habitat for Humanity, and Home 
First (a housing counseling nonprofit), and cooperated with the Bibb County 
government to receive and administer both the county and city's share of funding 
awarded by the state. This increased Macon's allocation from $1.9 million to $4.1 
million. The Economic and Community Development Department, which had been 
administering CDBG funds for over 30 years, was well-equipped to navigate the 
local, state, and federal policy and regulatory process and to marshal the capacity to 
implement its program through partnerships with local housing agencies. The city's 
NSP team, composed of these partners, designed a program to maximize the benefits 
to the community by building on local projects and leveraging additional resources. 
Based on the weak local housing market and severe state of disinvestment 
described earlier in this paper, however, the program focused on concentrating 
funding to the extent possible in order to affect a critical mass in strategic areas. 
Many cities did not take this approach. An article appearing in the Wall Street 
Journal, for example, exemplifies the types of choices communities had to make: 
The vastness of Avondale's foreclosure problem puts city officials in a bind. 
They could concentrate the $2.5 million they expect from the federal 
government in one or two neighborhoods and hope to reverse their 
declines. Or they could spread the money more widely, realizing that it's 
unlikely to achieve much in any one area. They're choosing the second path. 
"There just isn't enough money to do concentrated revitalization," said 
Andrew Rael, who manages the housing grant for the city (Phillips, 2008). 
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Thus, whereas the City of Avondale, AZ may have spread their funding equally and 
made very little impact on any one community or the city as a whole, the City of 
Macon concentrated its funding primarily in two Census Tracts, significantly 
changing the dynamics of neighborhood stability in those two neighborhoods while 
leaving the majority of the city untouched. In both cases, we can see how benefits to 
the community as a whole were tenuous and perhaps marginal, and were related 
both to the size of the award relative to local needs, as well as the particular strategy 
chosen by the locale. 
Based on these limited examples, it is difficult to quantify community 
benefits on a national scale. But they highlight some important factors in 
determining the potential for a community to realize the policy's intended benefits. 
First, NSP1 made a wide range of uses available to communities, allowing some 
flexibility in the types of responses to the crisis. However, specific restrictions on 
the types of properties eligible for purchase (i.e., foreclosed homes) limited the 
flexibility of grantees to respond to local problems (Joice, 2011, Immergluck, 2012). 
Second, the limited funding relative to the need in both hot markets (where high 
acquisition costs may limit the number of properties affected) and weak markets 
(where no level of funding could produce stable neighborhoods) may have 
hampered NSP1's ability to produce significant benefits on a community-let alone 
national-scale. 
Benefits to the Community: NSP2 (score 8 out of 10) 
I rate NSP2 higher in regards to community benefits primarily because of the 
potential for concentrating resources where there is strong capacity for 
implementation and a clear comprehensive plan. The competitive nature of the 
award, the minimum $5 million grant level and number of properties required to be 
affected (100 minimum per grant) encouraged the kind of partnerships and 
leveraging of resources that made one of Macon's projects so successful. I refer to a 
partnership with the Macon Housing Authority's nonprofit housing subsidiary to 
demolish and redevelop a 2 6-acre tract of abandoned apartment buildings. This 
project leveraged the city's $1.5 million NSP1 investment in demolition of the 
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structures with nearly $9 million in private capital raised through the sale of Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit Funds (LIHTC), $500,000 in additional CDBG funds, 
Housing Authority capital funds, and an additional $2.5 million from the state's NSP 
allocation that was set aside for LIHTC. 
Ironically, the City of Macon did not receive an NSP2 award, but the above 
model can nonetheless be illustrative of the type and structure of benefits that could 
be realized from a well-targeted and competitive program. 
Benefits to the Community: NSP3 (score 4 out of 10) 
I score NSP3 relatively low in this dimension primarily because of the level of 
funding was significantly less than the original NSP1 allocation. Where communities 
struggled to make a noticeable impact with the funds allocated under NSP1, the 
lower level of NSP3 funds made this even more challenging. Based on Macon's 
experience, however, there are alternative ways to view NSP3 benefits. On the 
positive side, because of prior experience with NSP1, jurisdictions may have been 
more equipped to plan and implement the program. In Macon's case, the same set 
of partners worked together to identify a feasible project fairly seamlessly. In 
addition, relaxed requirements for meeting the very low-income targeting goal 
made these benefits much easier to realize, especially for communities trying to 
leverage partnerships with tax credit developers (NHC.org website, letter to Senator 
Chris Dodd). 
On the potentially negative side, however, Macon's capacity was already 
stretched due to the ongoing administration of N SP1, a condition that may have 
been present in other jurisdictions that were unable to hire additional staff with the 
relatively small administrative costs allowed. Also, the emphasis of NSP3 on 
creating affordable rental opportunities could have been challenging for housing 
agencies that for years have been tooled for home ownership development. By 
chance, Macon was able to capitalize on an opportunity to work with one ofits 
previous partners in developing 12 units of permanent supportive housing, thus 
meeting a goal of the program and enhancing the success of an ongoing project in a 
very distressed neighborhood. However, this project signified the use of the city's 
22 
entire NSP3 allocation, preventing benefits from being realized in other 
communities. 
Political Viability: NSP1 (score 7 out of 1 0) 
On the dimension of political viability, I rate N SP1 moderate to high. This is 
because, much like CDBG, while the policy's support is under constant attack from 
Republicans at the federal level, support from states, local jurisdictions, and housing 
and community development advocates is very high. In addition, a federal program 
that can potentially address a failure in the private market may alleviate some stress 
for holders of REO, including banks and real estate companies with powerful federal 
lobbies. Another reason for this higher ranking is temporal; amidst the worst 
impacts that were being felt nationally from the foreclosure crisis, there was an 
opportunity for relative consensus around the need for a policy fix. This provided 
ample opportunity to negotiate a strong federal response, even though the ultimate 
outcome authorized far less funding than originally sought. 
At the local level, NSP1 was fairly popular, largely due to the fact that this 
federal funding was directly and widely allocated and made available to 
communities that needed the help. While much handwringing occurred among 
jurisdictions that felt they needed more funding or felt that the funding formula was 
skewed against them (including Macon), ultimately most jurisdictions received 
needed funding. I would count among NSP1's political vulnerabilities the basic 
newness of a federal housing program of this size for many communities. While I 
can't quantify this sentiment based on the information I have, the example I 
mentioned earlier about one suburban community outside of Macon holding a vote 
to reject the funding illustrates the potential for ideological frictions. 
Political Viability: NSP 2 (score 5 out of 1 0) 
I rank NSP2 lower on this dimension because it removed a base of political 
support from those that did not receive funding despite their needs. This had the 
potential to create some enmity and mistrust between jurisdictions and the federal 
agency responsible for the awards. In addition, NSP2 came out of a much more 
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visible piece oflegislation from the Obama administration that became very 
politically unpopular over time. On the other hand, converting NSP2 to a 
competitive grant may have served to address criticisms that funding was being 
wasted where it was not needed or where communities did not have the capacity to 
implement it. 
Political Viability: NSP3 (score 5 out of 1 0) 
While NSP3 also came out of a piece of hotly contested federal legislation 
(Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act), the allocation was 
smaller and perhaps not as noticeable. However, NSP3 had suffered the same 
vulnerability as its other iterations from House Republicans, who had introduced 
various bills aimed at ending the program and recapturing all unspent funds. 
Administrative Operability: NSP1 (score 4 out of 10) 
This dimension of NSP1 has been widely commented on and can be seen as a 
major impetus for changing the way awards were structured and distributed so 
drastically during its second round of funding. While HUD viewed using CDBG 
regulatory structure for NSP1 and its traditional entitlement jurisdictions as a point 
for distribution as an advantage to the agency, this did not necessarily translate into 
an advantage for all grantees. Because of HUD's limited role in administering NSP1, 
responsibilities of program design, targeting, administration, and program 
monitoring fell on states and local jurisdictions (Joice, 2011; Immergluck, 
forthcoming). In Macon, this meant administering an award larger than its annual 
CDBG allocation with the same number of staff, but under a compressed time frame 
and with admonitions from HUD along the way that the Inspector General and 
Department of Justice would be watching the grants closely. While a limited amount 
of funds could be used for salaries and administration, the City was reluctant to hire 
new staff to operate what was expected to be a temporary a program. 
Swanstrom et al. (2009) have pointed out that traditional CDBG entitlements 
were better prepared to administer these funds due to the strong regional resilience 
built up over time through collaboration across public, private, and nonprofit 
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housing partnerships ( 48). A recent Master's Thesis from Cornell University 
investigates this finding further and concludes that suburban communities with less 
housing experience were much less prepared to implement the requirements of 
NSP1 than their urban counterparts, especially in the case of meeting low-income 
housing set asides (Decker, 2 011). While as of this writing, the City of Macon has 
succeeded in implementing its NSP1 plan without any regulatory findings from the 
state or from HUD, there was considerable relief when news came down that Macon 
would not receive an additional $5 million NSP2 grant. 
In addition to the above, Immergluck (forthcoming) details another major 
problem with the administrative operability ofNSP1. He notes that the narrowness 
of regulations around property acquisition inhibited communities' ability to acquire 
strategic properties (27). The rapidly changing landscape of the market for REO 
properties, as he details in a different study on the volatility of the REO market 
(Immergluck, 2012), proved a challenging environment to compete with 
unregulated small-time investors purchasing low-value properties. These same 
properties were those likely to be targeted by NSP1 programs as well (58). 
While the weak market in Macon, coupled with local resilience and capacity, 
allowed the city room to maneuver around some of these restrictions, it is highly 
unlikely that communities new to vacant and foreclosed property issues would have 
the same capacity to navigate this terrain, especially in areas with a more active 
housing market. 
Administrative Operability: NSP2 (score 6 out of 10) 
NSP2 rates higher on this criterion principally due to two factors: 1) the 
liberalization of definitions of eligible properties; and 2) the reconfiguration of the 
grant toward an emphasis on capacity. While the first change was retroactive to 
NSP1, the larger shift in NSP2 policy sought to correct what had been perceived as a 
major shortcoming of NSP1. This change effectively gave HUD much more control 
over the size and allocation of grants. In addition, the change in geographic 
targeting methodology attempted to provide more flexibility in how grantees 
measured need across different types of markets (Joice, 2011: 139). The size of the 
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awards made and the decreased level of funding-half that of NSP1-provided the 
additional bonus for HUD of having far fewer grantees to monitor. One final plus for 
NSP2 in this category is the inclusion in the policy of $50 million set aside for 
capacity building. This technical assistance has been offered to all NSP recipients 
largely free of charge (aside from travel costs when necessary) in the form of 
regional problem solving clinics, one-on -one T A calls and visits, and a spate of 
webinars covering requested topics on an almost weekly basis at times. 
While these improvements probably increased the operability of the 
program all-around, grantees who were not previous CDBG or NSP1 recipients still 
were at the disadvantage of learning new regulations and reporting systems, which 
could have proved more difficult for nonprofit and for profit agencies not used to 
directly administering federal funds. 
Administrative Operability: NSP3 (score 6 out of 10) 
NSP3 receives a moderate score for operability because of the return to a 
now-familiar system, and smaller overall amount of funding awarded to each 
jurisdiction. The additional rule change making redevelopment of vacant properties 
eligible to qualify for the low-income set-aside was a bonus of this policy as well, 
allowing communities more flexibility in targeting properties for the program. But 
this change was offset by new program guidance and requirements regarding the 
emphasis on rental housing and vicinity hiring. For Macon, the focus on rental 
housing caused initial heartburn due to the city's lack of activity in the rental 
housing arena for many years, and it is probable than many communities had to 
retool to adjust to this new strategy. 
Eguit;y: NSP1 (score 7 out of 10) 
NSP1 scores relatively high on equity because of the policy's inclusion oflow-
income set-asides and minimum affordability requirements, which is on top of 
blanket CDBG rules on fair housing, discrimination, Davis Bacon wages, Section 3 
and minority contracting, and handicap accessibility, among others. However, the 
implementation and effectiveness of these regulations most likely varied heavily 
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among grantees based on the demographics of different regions. For example, 
Macon far exceeded its 25% set-aside by funding 15 Habitat for Humanity homes, 
which was in addition to 30 of the 75 single-family rental homes in the LIHTC 
project being set aside for very low-income families. However, a quick scan of 
recent quarterly reports to HUD reveals some suburban communities having a much 
harder time meeting this requirement, a finding supported by more extensive 
research done by Decker (2009) for his thesis cited earlier. 
While NSP1 policy attempts to achieve vertical equity standards through 
these requirements, horizontal equity in the face of such a massive foreclosure crisis 
is much more elusive. First, the sheer number of foreclosures dwarfs the actual 
number of homes expected to be redeveloped or reoccupied through NSP1 funds 
(Immergluck,forthcoming: 26-27). The question of concentrating resources in the 
hardest-hit neighborhoods, spreading funding around, or trying to stabilize higher 
performing neighborhoods before they decline beyond stabilization was left to local 
jurisdictions. Thus, the policy itself does not dictate the level of horizontal equity 
each community must attempt to achieve. To give another example from Macon, the 
majority of the city's Census Tracts qualified for NSP1 funding, whereas most of the 
funds were expended in only three of these Tracts. 
Eguity: NSP2 (score 4 out of 10) 
NSP2 scores low on the equity criteria because, on a national level, the policy 
fails to address many distressed areas that lacked the capacity to be competitive for 
the award. This lack of capacity could be in hard-hit areas without much civic 
infrastructure-or regional resilience as discussed above-further disadvantaging 
communities with little capacity to respond to foreclosure-related problems in the 
first place. In this sense, neither vertical nor horizontal equity was achieved at the 
national level. Where NSP2 was implemented, however, the same general 
conditions for equity in NSP1 should apply. 
27 
EQuity: NSP3 (6 out of 10) 
NSP3 included two key provisions that increase its equity score: the 
emphasis on affordable rental housing strategies and the requirement to make 
efforts to hire local workers for NSP projects. The only reason it scores lower than 
NSP1 is due to the lack of funding allocated in this round. In the City of Macon, this 
lack of funding led to a problem with horizontal, but not vertical equity. The city 
funded one project expected to house 10 out of 12 families below 5 Oo/o AMI, but 
could not leverage additional funds to focus outside of a single Block Group. 
Sustainability. Affordability. and Risk: NSP1 (5 out of 10) 
An initial key provision of NSP1 that was challenged and subsequently 
repealed would have required all unspent funding as well as program income 
generated from the sale of rental of NSP properties to be returned to the Treasury 
after a five-year period. The repeal of this provision changed the nature of NSP1 
and its subsequent rounds to allow for reinvestment of program funds back into 
NSP-eligible activities, and also incentivized private developers who were allowed 
to keep profits deemed reasonable to each jurisdiction, provided it did not create a 
perception of"undue enrichment" (Federal Register, 2009: 29224). This key feature 
enhances the sustainability of the program over time. 
Affordability, which I define above as a policy's ability to achieve its stated 
goal within the level of subsidy or resources allocated, is much harder to quantify 
for NSP1. This may be an awkward definition, but it is meant to capture the idea 
that sometimes the scope of a problem is so widely defined that no level of 
resources can adequately address it, thus exposing a policy to vulnerability from 
policy makers who do not want to be seen as throwing good money after bad. 
The reason this criteria is hard to quantify for NSP1 is that there are no 
requirements for matching funds, and very minimum standards regarding the 
amount of subsidy each unit should receive. Thus, a city could acquire, demolish, 
redevelop, and finance the sale of a home to a single individual, and end up spending 
a large portion ofits funds on a small number of properties. Conversely, a 
jurisdiction could limit its investment to temporary construction financing or small 
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amounts of "soft seconds" to fill gaps only where needed, thus extending the reach 
and leverage achieved. In Macon, both of these approaches were taken. In one 
neighborhood the city spent $1.7 million to build 15 houses, while in another the 
city spent the same amount on 75 homes. 
The other dimension of affordability is the ability to achieve the outcome of 
stability with the level of resources expended, which is also hard to quantify. For 
example, even though such a large investment was made in the former case of the 
15 homes in Macon, these were all built within a small target area and have 
effectively changed the face of that neighborhood to achieve some manner of 
stability. Had the same 15 homes been spread throughout the city, this goal would 
not have been reached. Because NSP1 policy was rather agnostic on the approach 
taken, I rate this policy low. 
Finally, in terms of risk, NSP1 presents a series of complicated rules and 
regulations that place the grantee in danger of unwittingly misappropriating funds. 
This danger is complicated by the multiple actors involved necessarily in property 
transactions, many of whom are not accustomed to the level of scrutiny required by 
CDBG and similar federal funding. 
Sustainability. Affordability. and Risk: NSP2 (score 7 out of 10) 
NSP2 has an improved score on this dimension over NSP1 because the policy 
affectively limits the amount of subsidy available per unit by requiring a minimum 
of100 homes (or units) to be touched for every grant. While the limit of the subsidy 
would increase with an increase in an award over $5 million, the requirement 
necessitates, or at least encourages, partnerships and leveraging of funding. In 
addition, a requirement of NSP2 for energy efficient and green-friendly design may 
effectively make each unit more affordable over time. 
Risk is rated higher with NSP2 as well because the competitive process built 
into the policy requires a high level of capacity in order to qualify for the grant, 
suggesting that NSP2 recipients are well positioned to administer the funds safely. 
However, just as with administrative operability, there is the chance that with new 
types of actors and partnerships receiving funds, a learning curve might put new 
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grantees at risk of regulatory infractions. The $50 million budgeted for technical 
assistance and capacity building should mitigate this effect somewhat. Finally, 
attempts have been made at the congressional level to defunct the program 
altogether, which introduces some risk to projects where contracts have yet to be 
signed. 
Sustainability. Affordability. and Risk: NSP3 (score 5 out of 10) 
NSP3 does not introduce new changes that substantively differentiate it from 
what has been noted in the evaluation of NSP1. A lower rating on the affordability 
dimension offsets the lowered risk from the relaxation of property eligibility 
requirements for the low-income set-aside. Again, the lack of rules regarding 
leveraging outside funding resulted in a project in Macon that was funded 100% 
with NSP3. As in NSP1, the will receive little, if any, program income on any ofits 
projects, resulting in a loss of subsidy over time as affordability requirements 
expire. While this may not have been the case in many other communities, I rate the 
policy based on its minimum requirements here. 
Step 5: Policy Evaluation Matrix 
Below I present a matrix that compares NSP1, 2 and 3 across the evaluation 
criteria discussed above in order to provide a clearer graphical representation of my 
evaluation. Scores for each criteria are weighted according the scheme described 
above, and are summed at the bottom of the matrix. A color scheme to represent 
intermediate scores helps to compare policies across the criteria rather than relying 
on total scores alone. This helps to identify key negative and positive dimensions of 
each policy to provide ideas for future directions of the program. Results score 
NSP1 the highest of the three policies at 5.9 out of10. NSP2 comes in a close second 
at 5.8, and NSP3 scored 5.4. After presentation of the matrix I discuss the 
implications of my results and conclude with some recommendations based on my 
analysis. 
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Table 2: Policy Evaluation Matrix 
Cntena 
Community 










• Wide range of uses 
• Rest rictive regulations 
• Dependent on local civic 
15% infrastructure/ resilience • Dependent of local market conditions 
• Dependent of size of grant relative to 
need 
25% 
CDBG "chassis" easier f rom HUD's 
perspective, difficult from local 
perspective 
• Highly regulated 
30% • Rest rictive use of funds 
• Problem adapting to evolving 
foreclosure landscape 
• Problems administering for " new" 
tees or tess resilient 
• 
• 25% tow-income set aside 
• Minimum period of af fordabitity 
15% • Potential problems in meeting tow-
income requirements 
• Horizontal equity dif ficult to achieve 
based on available funds- dependent 
on 
• Ability to rei nvest funding granted 
after initially being prevented 
• Few restricti ons of leveragin g funds-
15% highly dependent on program desi gn • High ri sk of running afoul of 
regulations 
• Policy changes create moving target 
100% 
*WS=Weighted Score 
• Higher capacity requi red to receive • Significantly tess funding 
funds available 
• Leveraging of funds encouraged by • Fewer units in raw numbers 
0.9 structure of grant 1.2 • Potential f or better program 0.6 
• Competition encouraged well desi gn based on improved 
designed programs capacity over time/experience 
• Enhanced geographic targeting 
• Problems f rom jurisdictions not • Less funding so tess visible 
funded • Continued threat of defunding 
• Potential political cover f rom not by House republicans 
2 "wasting" funds through di rect 1.2 1.3 
allocations regardless of capacity 
1.8 
Problems with vertical and horizontal 
equity housing 
• Areas without program capacity l eft • Vicinity hiring 
out 
0.6 • Low level of funding leaves 0.9 
• Otherwise same basic protections problems of horizontal equity 
• Dependent of program design 
• Otherwise same basic 
• Per levels reduced and • Relaxed regulations increase 
leveraging i ncreased ability t o meet statutory 
• Better planning and capacity means requirements 
0.8 fewer risks of program failure • Less funding to address problem 0.8 
• Energy efficiency for better tong-term and tack of leverage required 
affordabi tity I sustai nabil ity • Ri sk of legislative program 
• Potent ial problems with new types of termination 
- - 1111 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
In my introduction to this analysis I raised the issue oftradeoffs. While each 
of the policies evaluated represent incremental changes based on various levels of 
political and program feedback, tradeoffs are at the center of these changes. For 
NSP1 and NSP2 to result in such close scores yet be so different in nature suggests 
the possibility that even tradeoffs are possible across dimensions. This is relevant 
to policy development because it suggests an organic relationship between policy 
components and the types of criteria policy makers wish to fulfill. 
The above evaluation criteria and scoring are not intended to represent an 
exhaustive or empirical analysis of NSP policies, and the total scores may be 
considered somewhat arbitrary. I recognize that concepts among the criteria 
dimensions overlap somewhat and can be difficult to tease apart, but I have tried to 
score the policies consistently across dimensions. 
In addition, the incremental nature of evolving NSP policy presents 
somewhat of a moving target for trying to draw clear policy distinctions. Therefore, 
the evaluation matrix is perhaps more useful in distilling a few key features about 
NSP. First, NSP1 was a large, new, and wide-reaching program, and as such was 
bound to need testing and tweaking. In response to two major critiques-that the 
funding was insufficient and grantees were inconsistent in their capacity to 
administer the program-policy makers traded equity for operability and political 
viability for leverage, affordability, and enhanced targeting and control. Along the 
way, minor changes were made to attempt to respond to a growing understanding 
of the complexity of markets for REO and abandoned property, which continued to 
shift over time. NSP3 seemed almost like an afterthought, being smaller and less 
ambitious than either of the first two programs, and this may be reflective of the 
diminishing appetite for stimulus at the federal level and HUD's desire to avoid 
conflict and controversy among its grantees. 
Whatever these larger issues, however, what is clear is that local 
communities, states, nonprofits, and for profits all responded in kind by trying to 
make the best use of these policies according to their own organizational capacity 
and particular markets. I would argue that, in some cases, communities were 
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successful both in growing their own capacity through cross-collaborative efforts 
and in making strides toward stabilizing communities injured by the foreclosure 
crisis. It is in these lessons that NSP may provide longer-term policy guidance. 
While my analysis has by no means been comprehensive and may in fact be myopic 
given my closeness to one particular program, I suggest that these lessons may still 
be useful for potential future iterations of NSP: 
Recommendations 
1. Do not be afraid to create a new program. 
The use ofCDBG as a vehicle to deliver stimulus funds was unnecessary. 
Title III of HERA-Emergency Assistance for the Redevelopment of Abandoned and 
Foreclosed Homes-was all of 5 pages long. Although HUD was only given 60 days 
to develop rules and produce a formula for distributing funding, many limitations 
were built into the policy that were not reflected in the statutory language. While 
this suggestion may have been unrealistic at the time, hindsight allows the 
opportunity now to think ahead about what a less constricted policy might look like. 
2. Develop a better understanding of the relationship between organizational 
capacity, market condition~ and the design of effective foreclosure responses. 
Swanstrom et al. (2009), Immergluck (2009; 2012;forthcoming), and many 
others have provided critical analytical frameworks for understanding the dynamics 
of different actors their and responses to REO and abandoned property markets. 
Sufficient results from NSP activities should be available to begin conducting more 
robust and large-scale studies not only to identify key effective strategies, but to 
quantifY levels of effectiveness for various conditions that exist. These analyses 
could serve to provide more targeted and effective technical assistance, or to design 
more effective regulations at the outset. 
3. ClarifY program objectives. 
Federal policy should distinguish more clearly between neighborhood 
stabilization and neighborhood revitalization, and either provide clearer guidance 
33 
to grantees regarding the objectives of N SP or relax requirements and allow 
communities more free range to apply the funding to locally defined problems. 
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